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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to open the black box of Non Family Managers, within the Family 
Business context.  It challenges the dominant view according to which a  NFT (Non Family Team – 
team exclusively composed by Non Family Managers) is an homogeneous group, characterized by a 
formal style of management, focused on financial performance and not emotionally involved in the 
company. Here a factor approach is employed and the effects of three specific sources of NFT 
diversity (the number of Non Family Managers, the NFT Tenure Diversity and the NFT Dominant 
Functional Diversity) on the family firm performance, are examined. Results, from a survey 
conducted on the Top 500 Family Firms in the Italian Furniture Industry indicate that NFT  
Dominant Functional Diversity positively affects firm performance. A U-shaped relationship is 
found between NFT Organizational Tenure Diversity and family firm performance. Besides, 
conversely from prior studies we found support for the hypothesized inverted U-shaped relationship 
between NFT Size  and family firm performance.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is well established that the Top Management Team (TMT) composition has a much 
powerful impact in family than in non-family firms, given that family firms have to cope with the 
overlap of three subsystems such as the family, the ownership and the business (Gersik, 1999). 
About TMT composition, previous studies agree that as family firms become older and more 
established, the likelihood of bringing a greater numbers NFMs into the TMT increases (Lussier 
and Sonfield, 2007; Klein, 2007; Block, 2011). In a famous empirical work, by Klein (2000) on a 
random sample of all German family business, 44 per cent of all management boards were found to 
be completely controlled by family members, 42 per cent had a mixed top management team and 14 
per cent have a pure non family management. Similarly, Minichilli et al. (2010) in their study on the 
top 500 Italian Family Firms TMTs, found an average TMT Family ratio (ratio between family 
members involved in the TMT and the total number of TMT members) of 0.27, corroborating the 
hypothesis of a vast presence of NFMs in the Italian context. 
Indeed, a part from Dyer (1989) seminal article, family business literature has mainly be 
concerned with the specific mechanisms arising among the family managers, assessing the 
typologies of conflicts, ties and relationships that characterize this subgroup (e.g Eansley and 
Pearson, 2005; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). However, research 
explicitly focusing on NFMs is still scarce. More precisely, recent articles addressed the topic 
laterally to other main issues, or through the use of anecdotal or conceptual method, rather than via 
empirical investigation (Klein, 2007). Besides, few exceptions, conducting an empirical 
investigations (Minichilli et al., 2010; Berrone and Minichilli, WP), focused on the conflicts arising 
in integrating NFMs into the family context, basing their reasoning on the TMT Family Ratio, 
rather than on the top managers specific characteristics. Stressing the differences between FMs and 
NFMs and adopting a so-called faultine model, they predict the emergence of schism and conflicts 
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when both the subgroups are present (Minichilli et al., 2010; Minichilli and Berronw WP; Gomez-
Mejia, et al. 2007). In this light NFMs are considered as an homogeneous group (Hall and 
Nordqvist, 2011), characterized by a formal style of management, professional knowledge (Klein, 
2007), objectivity, focused on financial performance (Dyer, 1989; Klein, 2007) and not emotionally 
involved in the future of the company (Sonfield and Lussier, 2009). Thus, this approach assumes 
that all the members adopt the same opportunistic behaviour toward the family and the business, 
undertake the same actions and show the same relational dynamics with the FMs and with the other 
NFMs. However, NFMs also show an higher understanding of the family’s goals, norms and 
values, feel a strong psychological ownership and emotional attachment to their job (Dyer, 1989; 
Klein, 2007; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008; Bernhard and O’Driscoll, 2011). Actually a non-family 
team (NFT) is not supposed to be homogeneous, thus, showing a greater level of diversity. 
In this work, we reconcile two stream of researches, strategic management literatures that 
argue that firm performance is a reflection of its TMT (Upper Echelon Theory), and Family Firms 
literature (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Minichilli et al., 2010) to address the aspect of NFT 
diversity. Specifically, while previous works have identified specific sources of family team (FT) 
diversity affecting the family firm performance (see Ling and Kellermann, 2010), the same analysis 
hasn’t be conducted for the NFT. Thus, this work is organized around the following research 
question: How NFT Diversity affects Family Firms Performance? 
Accordingly we focus on three specific sources of diversity, relevant for the NFT: the number 
of NFMs (NFT Size), the NFT Organizational Tenure Diversity and the NFT Dominant Functional 
Diversity. Firstly, investigating on the role of NFT size implies that as the number of NFMs 
increases variance in capabilities and orientations occurs due to the unique experiences and social 
network they have faced with. That is, the fact of not belonging to the family system doesn’t infer 
that NFMs share identical values and attitudes. Secondly, focusing on the organizational tenure 
diversity, several scholars pointed out, that a NFT can be composed by NFMs that have been 
4 
professionalize over time and by outside professional managers that entered the family firm in later 
stages (Dyer, 1989). Thus, a NFT characterized by an higher level of organizational tenure diversity 
will be composed of individuals likely to have different attitudes toward the family firm and its 
strategy because of their tenure-stage differences (Boeker, 1997). Lastly, since dominant functional 
diversity detects the extent to which there is an heterogeneous mix of functional experiences within 
a team (Marcel, 2009), NFMs are not supposed to have gained the same experiences in the same 
functional areas. Conversely a NFT may avail itself of a limited or varied set of functionally based 
schema, depending on the functional areas covered by each members.  
From a survey conducted on the Top 500 Family Firms in the Italian Furniture Industry, we 
found that NFT size and family firm performance are characterized by an inverted U-shaped 
relationship. Conversely, NFT Organizational Tenure Diversity follows a U-Shaped trend with 
respect to the performance, while the NFT Dominant Functional Diversity is positively related to it. 
The contribution of this study is mainly toward family business literature. Firstly, through 
opening the NFMs’ black box it offers an additional level of complexity, thus enriching the 
understanding of TMT processes in family firms. Indeed, while prior studies investigated the 
relationship between FT diversity and firm performance (see Ling and Kellermanns, 2010), the 
same aspect has been almost disregarded  with respect to the NFT. Secondly, in contributes to group 
diversity theory, through the analysis of multiples relevant dimensions. The use of such a 
multifactor approach overcomes the limit of previous studies employing the faultline model, and 
allows for a more integrative and complete view (Mannix and Neale, 2005). Finally, we cautiously 
aim to enhance Upper Echelon understanding, that has mainly be concerned with large public 
corporations, overlooking the impact of top executives characteristics on privately held family firms 
performance (Minichilli et al., 2010). 
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4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
4.2.1 TMT Diversity and Family Firms Performance 
The issue of diversity, within the TMT field has always been described as a dual-edged 
sword, consisting of opposing forces that affect firm performance differently (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996; Mannix and Neale, 2005; Certo, Lester, Dalton and Dalton, 2006; Ling and 
Kellermanns, 2009). Therefore, while a stream of research has developed the advantages of 
heterogeneous TMTs, the other have highlighted the benefits of homogeneous ones (Certo et al., 
2006). The diversity advocates claim that heterogeneous TMTs are characterized by a broad range 
of knowledge, expertise and perspectives, and thus are able to provide higher-quality solutions than 
homogeneous ones (Mannix and Neale, 2005; Certo et al., 2006). Furthermore, relying on cognitive 
dissonance and divergent viewpoints, heterogeneous teams create a positive environment of 
constructive conflict and debate, in which ideas resolve into novel insights and solutions (Mannix 
and Neale, 2005). In the opposite way, other scholars have stressed the diversity drawbacks such as 
those related with integration, cohesion and coordination problems, that in turns result in negative 
performance (Mannix and Neale, 2005; Certo et al., 2006; Ling and Kellermanns, 2009).  
In this context, on one hand, family business scholars have highlighted the importance of 
cohesion and homogeneity among TMT members (Eansley and Pearson, 2005). Eansley and 
Pearson argued that depending on the level of familiness (Habbershon, Williams and MacMillian, 
2003), ties among TMT members are more or less effective. They conclude that more homogeneous 
group, such those characterized by parental ties (teams consisting of parents and child) are more 
effective than those characterized by familial (teams consisting of family members but without 
parental ties, such as cousins) or non-familial ties.  
On the other hand, more recent studies have reached the conclusion that TMT composed by 
diverse members have a positive impact on TMT behavioural integration and thus on firm 
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performance (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). From this standpoint, Ling and Kellermanns gave a 
specific definition of family firm TMT diversity (2010). Differently from previous researches, they 
argued that family members within the TMT are not supposed to be homogeneous. In particular 
they recognized three different sources of family firms diversity such as the generation in charge, 
the number of family employees and the number of employed generation (2010). As a result, they 
concluded that “familiar diversity” positively impacts on family firm performance. 
In the wake of this study, others asserted that the presence of multiple family members on the 
TMT is positively correlated with family firm financial performance (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2006). According to this view, the group of familiar executives is not seen as homogeneous, given 
that within the same family, variance in capabilities and orientations occurs due to the unique 
external experiences of each family member (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). Moreover this familiar 
diversity enhances, instead of worsening family firm performance (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2006; Ling and Kellermanns, 2010).  
However, further than diversity among FMs, another significant issue is that related to the 
diversity between FMs and NFMs, and within the NFT itself. Only few scholars have investigated 
the possible dynamics that the relationship between FMs and NFMs may originate (Klein, 2007; 
Minichilli et al., 2010). Building on organizational behaviour theory, Minichilli et al. recognized 
that a mixed top management team leads to a behavioural disruption, and consequently hurts 
performance, when a faultline among family and non-family executive occurs (2010). That is the 
case arising when the proportion of both factions increases in the corporate elites, on the contrary 
when there are few members of one or the other faction, conflicts are lowered because the minority 
faction has less power to contest decisions (Minichilli et al., 2010). Although dealing with the 
interaction between FT and NFT, Minichilli et al. neglect the role played by the intrinsic diversity 
of the these two subgroups. While a stream of literature have recognized the role played by the 
TMT diversity in the FT, analysing its specific sources, on the other side, the same specific sources 
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for the NFT have been disregarded. The dominant view depicts NFMs as subjects external to the 
family, that show the same objective, not emotionally involved and self-interested behaviors (Dyer, 
2989; Klein, 2007; Hall and Nodrqvist, 2008; Sonfield and Lussier, 2009). The tendency is, thus to 
equate NFMs with bringing in outsiders, and to look at NFMs and FMs as two different antithetical 
breeds, that are mutually exclusive (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008).  
Actually a NFT may show a higher level of diversity that could positively impacts on the 
family firms performance. Before examining the specific sources of NFT diversity the next section 
is dedicated to a brief literature review regarding NFMs and the role they play within the framework 
of Family Firms.  
4.2.2 Non-Family Managers in Family Firms 
NFMs (external, outside or professional managers) are defined as executives not having a 
blood or a marital or adoption relation to the owning family (Klein, 2007). As previously 
mentioned, previous studies agree that as a family firm grows, it tends to evolve from a pure family 
management to a “mixed constellation” TMT consisted of FMs and NFMs (Dyer, 1989; Klein, 
2007; Sonfield and Lussier, 2007; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008; Block, 2011). In other words, the so-
called professionalization process occurs (Dyer, 1989; Klein 2000; 2007).  
Although a shared position among scholars is reached about the relevance and the 
significance of the NFT, surprisingly there is relatively little (empirical) research on the role of 
NFMs in family firm (Block, 2011). In particular, previous studies have focused on the peculiar 
characteristics of the whole NFMs group, stressing the differences with the FMs one. Given these 
characteristics several authors have concentrated on the argument of conflicts arising among FMs 
and NFMs (Minichilli et al., 2010; Block, 2011). The reasoning at the basis of this issue is that the 
differences in family status, lead to the emergence of schisms and tensions that negatively impact 
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on behavioural integration and, in turn on firm performance (Chua, Chrisman and Sharma, 2003; 
Minichilli et al., 2010).  
Actually, a NFT can be composed by diverse members. For instance, it can consist of 
managers grew up in the family firm, that are likely to be idiosyncratic to the family and the 
business (Dyer, 1989). Thus, they are not characterized by the objective, formal and non-contextual 
approach depicted by the dominant view. Instead, they are likely to feel a strong emotional 
attachment to their job, acting toward the family and the firm, as stewards (Hendry, 2002; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Klein, 2007).  
Indeed, previous studies, investigating the role of NFMs in family firm, have always 
employed a so-called proportional approach, using the family status as the only single attribute that 
originates diversity within the TMT. That is the case of the above mentioned Minichilli et al. (2010) 
work on the faultline among FMs and NFMs that leads to conflicts and detrimental performance. 
The employment of this kind of approach, has led scholars to reach the belief that FT and NFT are 
antithetical and mutually exclusive factions, that try to prevail one against the other. Nevertheless, 
the well-known downside of proportional approaches is that they focus on single membership 
variables (such as gender or race or family status) and, in turn, miss the potential impact of other 
key attributes and their interactions (Mannix and Neale, 2005).  
On the contrary with the so-called multifactor approach, diversity is conceptualized in terms 
of an array of relevant and salient (depending on the context) variables. The employment of this 
approach allows for an integrative view of the effects of multiple types of diversity on group 
performance (Mannix and Neale, 2005).  
In the light of this reasoning, here a multifactor approach is employed. Consistently with the 
theoretical framework adopted, we follow the Upper Echelons tradition, which focuses on TMT 
demographic characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 1989; Finkelstein and 
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Hambrick, 1996). In particular, we employ the three TMT Demographic indicators that have 
received substantial conceptual and empirical attention in the extant literature: the number of NFMs 
(or NFT size), the NFT organizational tenure diversity and the dominant functional diversity of 
NFMs. Therefore, a NFT could be more or less effective depending on the intrinsic differences that 
emerge among its members. With this assumption in mind, the next section explores the impact 
each of the proposed specific sources exert on the family firm performance.  
4.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 Number of Non–Family Managers (NFT Size)  
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) suggest that the team size represents an important 
determinant of team diversity and, in turn, of firm performance. In the family business context, it 
could be argued that as the number of NFMs increases, so will the number of individual judgments 
that can be used to correct errors that occur during the decision making process and thus the number 
of potential solutions (Certo et al, 2006; Ling and Kellermanns, 2009). Furthermore a large NFT, 
given the landscape of values and expertise it includes, provides a wider room for cognitive conflict 
(Certo et al., 2006). Such conflict concerns with the work-at-hand without involving non-task 
related issues, like negative emotions (Kellermanns and Eddlestone, 2006). By openly discussing 
the merit of ideas, cognitive conflict improves the range of options for decision-makers and leads to 
high-quality strategic decisions. So, we can initially predict a positive effect of NFT size on family 
firm performance. 
 However, when the NFT size becomes disproportionate, the effect exerted by the cognitive 
conflict, may ultimately turns into the so-called “creative destruction” phenomenon (Morck and 
Yeung, 2003; Morck, Strangeland and Yeung, 2000). That is,  when the number of NFMs comes to 
be excessive, the positive effect of creativity and innovativeness is replaced by a decrease in the 
level of familiness, from which the firm draws its competitive advantage, (Habbershon and 
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Williams, 1999). In other words a detachment from the family values and norms, instituted by the 
founder and rooted in the family and its history, may arise.  Indeed, the initial effect exerted on the 
performance by the cognitive conflict, make the family fosters NFMs profitable initiatives. 
However when the family feels NFMs cracking the familiness status-quo or passing over its values 
and norms, it removes its support toward those initiatives. Fear for such a loss in control and in 
family values lead the family blocking or discouraging NFMs creativity and innovation and thus 
stifle family firm performance (Lussier and Sonfield, 2007; Sonfield and Lussier, 2009). This 
reasoning argues for the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship. In other words, as the 
number on NFMs increases a positive impact on performance, due to the emergence of cognitive 
conflict, occurs. However, when the limit of familiness is overcome this positive impact turns into 
negative, because of the “creative destruction” effect.  
Hypothesis 1 – There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the NFT size and the 
Family Firm performance.  
NFT Tenure Diversity  
Arguing that a NFT exhibits high organizational tenure diversity indicates that its members 
entered the family businesses, at very temporally distant times  (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hall and Nordqvist, 2008). Therefore, it means that NFMs with 
longer and shorter organizational tenure interact within the same team. In the opposite way, a NFT 
with lower level of organizational tenure diversity means that the team is almost composed by 
either higher or shorter tenured NFMs. 
Higher tenured NFMs bring a set of advantages to the family firm, given that they are likely 
to share with familiar members the same private language, routines and organizational culture 
(Klein, 2007; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2006; Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2007).  
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On the other hand, shorter tenured NFMs, given their open and not parochial mindset, are 
more likely to bring in the family firms innovative and creative ideas, breaking with previous 
patterns and practices, thus enhancing family firm performance.  
That is, in a NFT mostly composed by higher tenured NFMs, the firm benefits from their 
business idiosyncrasy and emotional attachment to the family. Besides, higher-tenured NFMs, 
given their longer experience together, are more prone to behave collaboratively and to bring  more 
fluid team procedures and processes. In the same way, when there is a preponderance of shorter 
tenured NFMs, the firm takes advantage from their ability to generate creative practices and new 
expertise. Shorter-tenured NFMs are not embedded in the firm organizational routines and 
rigidities, thus they are likely to provide a fertile and supportive climate for group cohesiveness and 
potency.   
In such a context a NFT showing mixed tenured NFMs may lead to relationship conflicts, that is a 
dysfunctional form of conflict that includes affective components, like annoyance, personal 
animosity and irritation of others (Klein, 2007; Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2006; Kellermanns and 
Eddleston, 2007).  In particular, while in more homogeneous teams the team play effect prevails 
because of the aforementioned reasons, when the tenure shows an  higher dispersion,  rivalry among  
NFMs arises. Furthermore, the entry of new executives in recurring waves, lead to the problem of 
periodically integrate persons who lack the shared experience that are common to the rest. 
So, we can initially predict a negative effect of NFT tenure diversity on family firm 
performance. However, when ,  the differences in tenure among the NFMs are much extended and 
not so nearby, that is when a NFT is characterized by highest level of organizational tenure 
diversity, the effects on performance turns into positive. In such a case longer-tenured NFMs can 
introduce NFMs with shorter one to the organizational culture, language and  routine, behaving as 
mentors. On the other hand, shorter tenured NFMs, enable NFMs with higher tenure to escape from 
the boundaries of organizational inertia. In this sense longer-tenured NFMs  might route shorter 
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tenured NFMs novel ideas into the family firm rules and routines, enabling their adaptation to the 
organizational tissue and avoiding the firm to fall into the “creative destruction problem”. Higher 
tenure diversity increases the likelihood of beneficial task-oriented conflict, that is a beneficial kind 
of conflict that involve constructive debate, creative ideas, novel insights, simultaneously retaining 
the organizational culture and the family values. At the same time, the relationship conflict 
originated by the rivalry among NFMs is softened, because  NFMs characterized by such different 
and not comparable positions, in terms of tenure, don’t perceive one another as a threat. Therefore, 
the NFT organizational tenure diversity exerts a negative effect on family firm performance, 
because of the relationship conflict problem, however beyond a certain point,  this effect turns into 
positive, because of the complementarities showed by NFMs that originate functional task-oriented 
conflict.  
Hypothesis 2 – There is a U-Shaped  relationship between the NFT Tenure Diversity and the 
Family Firm Performance. 
NFT Dominant Functional Diversity  
Another demographic indicator most frequently studied in the Upper Echelons tradition is the 
functional background on TMT members (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Cannella, Park and Lee, 
2008; Marcel, 2009). We adopt the definition used by Cannella et al. (2008), according to which 
dominant functional diversity is the functional area in which each team members has spent the most 
time.  
As stated above,  as TMT dominant functional diversity increases as does the breadth of 
knowledge, perspectives, experience and capabilities that the overall team can bring to bear in a 
decision situation (Cannella et al., 2008). As Cannella et al. pointed out more diverse team, in terms 
of functional background can generate more alternatives to creatively solve complex problem, 
reduce “groupthink” and increase decision effectiveness (2008).  
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In the particular case of NFT a higher level of dominant functional diversity helps to go 
through the organizational inertia problem with which the majority of family firms often face 
(Chirico and Nordqvist, 2010). Therefore, as several studies have highlighted the effect of the 
generational shadow shed by the founder and casted over the organization throughout subsequent 
generation, exerts a detrimental effect on the firm performance (Davis and Harveston, 1999; 
Sonfield and Lussier, 2004). In this light the aforementioned core capability of familiness is likely 
to become a core rigidities, and thus to make family firms less able to adapt and cope with the 
challenges of a changing environment (Chirico and Nordqvist, 2010).  
In this context, a NFT with a higher level of dominant functional diversity can help family 
firm to overcome the generational shadow effect and in turn, to embank the effect of organizational 
inertia. As a matter of fact a NFT, including different backgrounds, generates idea conflicts, that are 
functional kind of conflicts, that lead to creative and innovative solutions, increasing the capacity to 
predict, interpret and effectively respond to environmental changes (Eansley and Pearson, 2005; 
Salvato and Melin, 2008; Cannella et al., 2008; Chirico and Nordqvist, 2010). 
Nevertheless, given the strong involvement of the family in the decision-making process, 
NFMs are often delegated to precise functional areas,  characterized by low level of discretion (e.g. 
sales or distribution) (Escribà-Esteve, Sànchez-Peinado and Sànchez-Peinado, 2009). Said 
differently, NFT often are characterized by lower level of dominant functional diversity. However, 
through incorporating NFMs specialized in many different and more significant functional areas, 
family firms can enhance their level of strategic orientation and cognitive conflict, fostering the 
ability to detect risks and opportunities, and to generate novel patterns of action and innovative 
ideas (Zahara, Hayton and Salvato, 2004). In this light it could be argued that as the NFT dominant 
functional diversity increases, so will the family firm performance.  
Hypothesis 3 – There is a positive relationship between the NFT Dominant Functional 
Diversity and the Family Firm Performance. 
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4.4 METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection procedure 
The analysis is based on an original dataset covering the entire population of Italian family-
controlled firms in the Furniture industry. According to the quali-quantitative definition by “IL Club 
dei Distretti”, the companies operating in the Furniture Districts can be identified through the 
ATECO 2007 classification of economic activities. These firms fall under the compartment 31.000 
“Furniture Manufacture”. 
The choice of the furniture industry has multiple motivations primarily related to the role it 
plays in the whole national economy and the peculiar organization of the production in Industrial 
Districts (IDs).  With respect to the former argument the Italian Furniture industry represents an 
important contributor to the whole Italian GDP and exports. Indeed, with a share of 10% of the total 
worldwide production, Italy is the third largest player in the furniture industry (BNP Paribas 
Economic Research, 2011). Over the past 10 years, Italy has maintained its leadership as the major 
exporter with a share of the total close to 9 percent (BNP Paribas Economic Research, 2011). 
Furthermore, in the first 10 months of 2011, exports showed a 4,4 percent increase, with respect to 
the previous year. 
With respect to the organization in IDs, the majority of previous empirical studies agree that 
they are mainly composed by family managed firms, that are often overcoming the second or the 
third generation (Belussi, 1999; Belussi and Sedita, 2009; Belussi, 2010; Chiarvesio et al., 2010). 
Besides, several authors stated that the most important IDs in Italy have often developed in a 
successful way, because of the leading role played by family firms. The furniture districts are not an 
exception. For instance, well-known examples are Natuzzi, Calia and Nicoletti in the upholstery 
district of Matera (Morrison, 2004; Belussi, 1999; Borga et al., 2009), Flou, Molteni and 
Misuraemme in the furniture district of Brianza (Borga et al, 2009; Chiarvesio et al., 2010), 
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Scavolini in the kitchen district of Marche and Snaidero in the Triveneto one.  This makes pertinent, 
therefore, to examine family firm management issues in this traditional industry.  
The entire population is composed by more than eighteen thousand firms. Further, out of this 
population, we considered only those firms that fall under the definition of family firm. In the 
matter of  this argument, although there are several possible definitions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2007; Chua et al., 2003; Minichilli et al.2010; Prencipe et al., 2010), we 
identified as family firms those in which one or more families is linked by kinship, close affinity, or 
solid alliances and holds a sufficiently large share of risk capital to enable members to make 
decisions regarding strategic management (Prencipe et al.2008; Minichilli et al, 2010). 
Specifically, we adopted the Minichilli et al. (2010) classification, according to which a firm 
is defined as a family firm, when the same dominant family (or families)  owns (directly or 
indirectly through subholdings) more than 50 per cent of the shares.  The threshold is reduced to 30 
per cent for listed companies, which is reasonable given the features of the Italian stock exchange 
This definition is in line with previous studies on family firms TMTs,  according to which family 
control can be identified as the fractional equity holding by family members (founding or 
descendants), which allows ownership control over the company (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Lee, 
2006; Minichilli et al., 2010).  To collect data on ownership we used public sources such as AIDA 
(Italian Digital Database of Companies) – the Italian branch of Bereau van Dijk European 
Databases.  
Once identified the family firms within the Ateco 31.000 section, given the peculiar structure 
of the industry, that is extremely fragmented in a large number of micro-firms, we included into the 
final sample the top 500 firms with respect to revenues. 
For the hypothesis testing, we sent an electronic survey to all CEOs and Chairpersons of the 
500 firms sampled, to gather information on their TMTs’ characteristics. Given that most of the 
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information required in the questionnaire refers to objective data, we considered it proper to have at 
least one respondent as a key informant in the TMT for each of the firms involved in the survey. 
To ascertain the comprehensiveness of the questionnaires, an in-depth pre-test to streamline 
the questionnaire on 2 influential family firm of the industry was carried on. About 2 hour-long 
semi-structured interviews with the CEO or other key informants were administered. Additional 
archival data have been collected for firms in the larger sample frame in order to check for the non-
respondent bias, using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov procedure. A total of 97 out of 500 firms 
responded to the survey, providing data on 97 different TMT’s. A total of 584 questionnaires were 
retained.  
MEASURES 
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable is family firm performance. Following Minichilli et al. (2010) and 
taking into account that the sample is constituted also of small and not listed companies we used as 
a measure of the dependent variable  the ROA. Furthermore ROA is a well understood and common 
measure used in several studies on the impact of TMT’s characteristics (Minichilli et al., 2010).  
Independent Variables  
A definition of top management team (TMT) was included in the questionnaire to avoid 
misunderstandings. It  considers a TMT to consist of the CEO; CFO and the Chair Person, and all 
the other top executives on the management board and/or reporting directly to the CEO of the firm 
(Minichilli et al., 2010).  
Accordingly the Non Family Team (NFT) is defined as a team composed by Top 
Management Team Members, not related to the controlling family, reporting directly to the firm’s 
chief executive (Boeker, 1997).  
17 
NFT Size – Measured as the total number of NFMs in the company’s TMT, as reported by the 
CEO (Simsek et al., 2005)  
NFT Organizational Tenure Diversity – Team tenure is measured by taking the average of the 
aggregate organizational tenure of all NFMs within the NFT. NFT Tenure diversity was measured 
using the coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean. Wiersema 
and Bantel (1992), following Allison (1978), noted that the coefficient of variation, because it is a 
scale-invariant measure, is preferred to the standard deviation or variance for interval-level 
variables.  
NFT Dominant Functional Diversity –It’s the breadth of exposure to different functional 
areas. Measured by asking respondents to indicate the functional specialty of each NFT member 
into one of eight tracks (finance; accounting and auditing; human resources; marketing and sales; 
law; production-operations; R&D and engineering; administration and general management). Team 
members will be allowed to indicate up to three categories, taking into account that many people 
gain experiences outside their dominant career track (Buyl et al., 2011).  
This increases the ecological validity compared to only considering one function, which is the 
standard approach in measuring functional background diversity. However, the downside of this 
approach is that obtaining a ‘pure’ index of functional diversity becomes more complicated, since 
we measured two types of information jointly: the extent of expertise-overlap of the team members, 
as well as the number of functions indicated by each of the team members (i.e. whether the team 
member is a generalist or a specialist). Ideally, it should be measured the distribution of unique 
functional expertise between TMT members, i.e. between-member functional diversity net of 
intrapersonal functional diversity (for details, see Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002), since theory 
emphasizes the information exchange and integration problems of people with non-overlapping 
knowledge working together (Brodbeck et al., 2007). 
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The mostly-used Shannon–Wiener measure of information and the analogous Herfindahl or 
Blau index do not disentangle both sources of diversity. Therefore, in this context, the Attneave’s 
(1959) entropy-based, so-called ‘transmission measure’ Txy, is the most correct indicator. This 
measure can be derived from three types of information contained in any two-dimensional “team 
member (dimension Y with members from 1 to j) – functional category (dimension X with 
functional categories from 1 to i)” frequency table:  
- the proportional distribution of the number of team members over the functional categories 
summarized by the marginal entropy measure Hx (i.e. the standard Shannon–Wiener 
measure);  
- the proportional distribution of the number of functional categories over the team members 
summarized by the marginal entropy measure Hy; and  
- the total entropy of the frequency table indicated as Hxy. 
   ∑       
 
  ⁄  
   where i stands for any functional category 
   ∑       
 
  ⁄  
 
  where j stands for any team member 
    ∑        
 
   ⁄  
  
 where i stands for any functional category and j for any team 
member. 
Txy, or transmission, equals (Hx + Hy - Hxy) and can be interpreted as a measure of 
association between the two dimensions of a frequency table, i.e. team members and functional 
categories in our study (Attneave, 1959). Note that a large value of Txy implies high functional 
background diversity, with expertise being uniquely distributed over team members. 
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Control Variables  
Firm Level  
Firm size – measured as a logarithmic transformation of sales as reported from the 
respondents (Boeker, 1997), checking it with other publicly available sources.  
Firm age – measured by asking the number of years since the company was established, as it 
has been associated with the institutional routines and norms that affect firm performance (Ling and 
Kellermanns, 2010). Another check has been carried on with other publicly available sources (e.g. 
Aida) 
Generation in charge of the firm – measured by asking which generation of the family 
controls the firm’s ownership (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). Answers ranged from “first 
generation”, “second generation”, “third generation”, “fourth generation”, “fifth generation”, 
“beyond the fifth generation”. Of the firms in our sample, 29 per cent are controlled by the first 
generation (coded as 1), 57 per cent by the second generation (coded as two), 13 per cent by the 
third generation (coded as 3) and only one firm was controlled by the fourth generation (coded as 
four). 
A definition of generation as the latest generation of family members who are active in the 
firm as officer, directors, blockholders relative to the generation of the founder, was included in the 
questionnaire (Villalonga and Amit, 2010).  
The number of employed generations – measured by asking how many generations of the 
family are employed at the firm (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). In total, 23 per cent indicated one 
generation, 71 per cent indicated two generations, and only 5 per cent indicated three generations. 
Pre-performance - was controlled as the average ROA between year t-4 and t-1 (Marcel, 
2009). 
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Team Level  
TMT Educational Background Diversity – obtained by classifying each executive into one of 
five categories based on the highest degree awarded (arts, science, engineering business and 
economics, law). A variants of the HH index calculated as   ∑  
  , where    is the proportion of 
a TMT in the ith category, will be employed (Blau, 1977).  
TMT Level of Studies Diversity – obtained by classifying each executive into one of five 
categories based on the level of degree awarded (primary school degree, medium school degree, 
high school degree, college degree (master or bachelor) and PhD degree). Like in educational 
background diversity, a variants of the HH index calculated as   ∑  
  , where    is the 
proportion of a NFT in the ith category, will be employed (Blau, 1977).  
TMT Gender - at the individual level the gender (1= female, 0= male) has been captured for 
each executive. (Blau, 1977).  
TMT Age – at the individual level the age has been captured for each executive. The  team 
level age will be measured with the coefficient of variation, as the standard deviation divided by the 
means of the age of each executive within the NFT (Allison 1978) 
TMT Average Organizational Tenure - is an important control variable when tenure diversity is 
calculated using the coefficient of variation (Allison, 1978).  
TMT Average TMT  Tenure – at the individual level the tenure in the TMT has been captured 
for each executive. At the  team level the TMT tenure was measured as the mean number of years 
of employment in the TMT of all the TMT members in year t (Allison 1978) 
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Individual Level  
CEO Tenure – computed as the number of years in office the CEO served in the firm, as 
reported in the questionnaire (Minichilli et al., 2010). This is important in family-controlled firms, 
where CEOs tend to remain in office longer and are more difficult to remove than in publicly 
controlled firms.  
Specialist CEO – operationalized as a dummy variable that equals to 1 when the CEO has a 
functional experience in only one of the eight functional categories proposed, and 0 otherwise.  
CEO Gender – is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is a female and 0 otherwise.  
CEO Age – Measured by asking the CEO his/her age through the questionnaire.  
CEO Founder – is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is the founder of the firm  
4.5 RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics used in this study are reported in Table 2 and correlations of 
variables in Table 1. None of the correlation coefficients raises potential problems of multi-
collinearity. We tested the hypotheses through hierarchical multiple regression analyses, entered in 
multiple steps. The ultimate number of observations (92) resulted from the removal of 5 cases for 
which there were unavailable or incomplete data. The size of the sample is consistent  with previous 
studies on TMT and mainly on Family Firms TMT (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Pelled et al., 1999; 
Minichilli et al., 2010). 
--- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
--- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
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The results of the regression analyses are reported in Table 3. Model 1 of Table 3 reports the 
control variables for the Performance valuation estimates. Firm Pre-performance, TMT average 
TMT Tenure and the presence of a Specialized CEO are positively associated to it, while TMT 
Educational Background Diversity and TMT Average Organizational Tenure are negatively 
associated to it.  
The independent variable NFT Size was added in Model 2 to test whether there was a 
significant effect on performance. Model 3 investigates whether the NFT Size have an inverted U-
shaped effect on firm performance. Results are consistent with Hypothesis 1. Specifically, both the 
positive and statistically significant (β=1.56, p < 0.05) effects of the main term and the negative and 
statistically significant (β= -0.19, p < 0.05) coefficient of the quadratic term confirm the prediction.  
--- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
In order to test if NFT Tenure Diversity has a U-Shaped effect on the firm performance, 
Model 4 introduce the NFT Tenure Diversity quadratic term. In this model, the main term effect is 
negative and statistically significant (β= -10.31, p<0,05)  and the quadratic term effect is positive 
and statistically significant (β= 8.68, p<0.05). This result suggests that the negative effect of NFT 
Tenure Diversity, after a certain threshold turns into a positive one. No change is observed in the 
sign for NFT size compared with model 3, that is still significant. In Model 5 the NFT Dominant 
Functional Diversity has been introduced. The coefficient is positive and significant (β=3.27, p < 
0.01). 
To verify that results were not distorted by multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) 
have been calculated for all the models presented. The maximum VIF found within our models was 
below the commonly used rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10 (Cohen et al., 2003), indicating that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in the analysis.  
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4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary purpose of this study was to open the black box of NFMs, challenging the 
dominant view and examining the role they play within the family companies. Previous studies 
have always used a proportional approach to investigate the relationship among the  TMT 
composition and Family Firm Performance. This kind of approach has led to a misleading 
interpretation of the dynamics arising among Family and Non Family Managers. That is, because it 
employs a membership status (family or not family) as the only single attribute that may originate 
diversity. As a result, TMT in family firms have always been considered from the perspective of 
conflicts arising between two, antithetical and mutually exclusive factions of Family and Non 
Family Managers. Besides, according to this view a NFT is an homogeneous group (Hall and 
Nordqvist, 2011), characterized by a formal style of management, professional knowledge (Klein, 
2007), objectivity, focused on financial performance (Dyer, 1989; Klein, 2007) and not emotionally 
involved in the future of the company (Sonfield and Lussier, 2009).  
Adopting a multi-faceted factor approach, allows for a more integrative and less simplistic 
view of the role played by NFMs in the Family Firm. As a consequence, following the Upper 
Echelon Theory, three specific sources of NFT diversity have been identified, arguing that the 
Number of NFMs, the NFT Tenure Diversity and the NFT Dominant Functional Diversity 
positively impact on the Family Firm Performance.  
Empirical results supports the hypothesis developed. In particular we found that as the size of 
a NFT increases, so does the performance of the firm, until the number of NFMs overcome the limit 
of challenging the familiness status quo. Beyond this point, increases in NFT size leads to the 
creative destruction phenomenon, that in turn exerts a negative effect on firm performance. 
With respect to the second hypothesis, the U-Shaped relationship between the NFT Tenure 
Diversity and the Family Firm performance, was confirmed. That is, the NFT Tenure Diversity 
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exerts a negative impact on the firm performance, however this effect changes into positive for 
higher level of NFT Tenure Diversity. More homogeneous NFTs in terms of organizational tenure 
diversity, favor family firm performance. When diversity emerges, negative effect related to rivalry 
and relationship conflicts arise. However, this effect turns into positive for higher level of tenure 
diversity. Higher level of organizational tenure diversity means that NFMs with higher tenure and 
shorter tenure coexist in the same team. The large temporal difference in terms of tenure between 
them, softens the relationship conflicts problem and fosters beneficial task-conflict, supporting the 
family to overcome both the problem of organizational inertia and of creative destruction. 
The last and more significant result fosters the diversity advocates, given that it confirms that 
more diversified NFT with respect of functional background, lead to higher performance.  
Thus, the major contribution of this paper is to family business literature. We opened the 
NFMs black box, adding a further layer of complexity to the TMT dynamics in family businesses. 
NFTs are not homogeneous, but differ in terms of size, organizational tenure and functional 
background. As a result the effect they exert on family firm performance depends on the their 
intrinsic level of diversity.  
In this sense, we also enhanced the group diversity theory understanding, demonstrating the 
efficacy of the multifactor approach, compared with the proportional one. Among the proportional 
approaches, the faultline model has always been employed in studies analyzing NFMs. However, 
basing only on the membership status, it missed the potential contribution of relevant factors, such 
those analysed in this study.  
Besides, given the empirical setting adopted to test our hypothesis, we have also demonstrated 
the potency of Upper Echelon Theory for small and medium family firms. As it was foreseeable, 
family firms are a reflection of their top management.  
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Concerning the empirical setting, we further gave a strong managerial contribution to family 
firms in the Italian Furniture Districts. Given the turbulence and crisis they are facing with, the 
professionalization of management is considered a key process to undertake in order to maintain the 
global competitive advantage, they have obtained in the last fifty years. In this sense, we provide a 
valuable tool for effectively managing such process. 
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Figure 1 -Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NFT Tenure Diversity 
NFT Dominant 
Functional Diversity 
NFT Size 
FF Performance 
H1 
H2 
H3 
27 
Table 1 - Correlation Matrix 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 
1. Performance 1.00                     
2. NFT Size 0.12 1.00                    
3. NFT Organizational Tenure Diversity 0.12 1.34* 1.00                   
4.NFT Dominant Functional Diversity 0.31* 0.80* 0.40* 1.00                  
5.  Firm Size 0.20 0.53* 0.24* 0.41* 1.00                 
6. Firm Age 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.05 1.00                
7.  Generation in charge -0.09 -0.06 0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.46* 1.00               
8.  Number of employed generation 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.06 0.00 -0.01 1.00              
9. TMT Educational Background 
Diversity  
0.11 0.33* 0.31* 0.42* 0.20 0.05 -0.02 0.29* 1.00           
  
10. TMT Level of Studies Diversity  -0.12 0.10 -0.18 0.06 -0.02 0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.11 1.00            
11. TMT Gender 0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.06 -0.14 0.03 1.00           
12. Preperformance 0.71* -0.01 -0.07 0.08 0.13 -0.12 -0.11 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.07 1.00          
13. TMT Age 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.20* 0.25* 0.06 -0.11 0.11 1.00         
14. TMT Average Organizational 
Tenure  
-0.09 -0.24* -0.21* -0.20* -0.21* 0.22 0.13 0.29* -0.13 -0.07 0.17 0.03 -0.20 1.00        
15. TMT Average TMT Tenure 0.05 -0.17 -0.20 -0.14 -0.21* 0.18 -0.05 0.32* 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.06 -0.16 0.86* 1.00       
16. Ceo Tenure 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.18 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.58* 0.45* 1.00      
17. Specialized CEO 0.05 0.08 0.25* 0.20 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.16 -0.03 0.02 -0.14 -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 1.00     
18.  Ceo Gender 0.06 -0.01 -0.18 -0.12 0.11 -0.10 -0.13 0.01 -0.17 0.23* 0.22* 0.19 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.16 -0.02 1.00    
19. Ceo Age 0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.14 0.06 -0.10 0.24* 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.13 0.49* 0.41* 0.82* 0.00 0.27* 1.00   
20. Founder Ceo 0.19 0.06 -0.04 0.09 0.07 -0.32* -0.49* 0.04 0.15 0.01 -0.05 0.19 0.15 -0.02 0.10 0.32* -0.07 0.20 0.44* 1.00  
21. Family Ceo 0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.22* -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.06 -0.11 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.27* -0.21 -0.09 0.09 0.24* 1.00 
*(p < 0.05); n = 92 
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean St.Dev Min Max 
1. Performance 2,70 5.70 -12.45 21.85 
2. NFT Size 3.08 1.62 0.00 9.00 
3. NFT Organizational Tenure 
Diversity 
0.45 0.33 0.00 1.44 
4.NFT Dominant Functional Diversity 1.14 0.68 0.00 2.41 
5. Firm Size 9,82 0.92 7.16 13.04 
6. Firm Age 36.09 20.68 4.00 129.00 
7.  Generation in charge 1.85 0.65 1.00 4.00 
8.  Number of employed generation 1.82 0.51 1.00 3.00 
9. TMT Educational Background 
Diversity  
0.55 0.17 0.00 0.86 
10. TMT Level of Studies Diversity 0.51 0.20 0.00 0.98 
11. TMT Gender 0.80 0.16 0.50 1.00 
12. Preperformance 3.30 5.80 -5.21 36.62 
13. TMT Age 0.21 0.08 0.03 0.59 
14. TMT Average Organizational 
Tenure  
17.81 7.03 3.40 39.50 
15. TMT Average TMT Tenure 14.60 7.35 1.66 39.50 
16. Ceo Tenure 28.37 13.35 2.00 60.00 
17. Specialized CEO 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
18.  Ceo Gender 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00 
19. Ceo Age 56.57 11.50 36.00 83.00 
20. Founder Ceo 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
21. Family Ceo 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 
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Table 3 - Full Model 
 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; standard errors in parentheses. 
 
N = 92 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Performance OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
NFT Size  
0.18 
(0.32) 
1.56** 
(0.75) 
1.48* 
(0.81) 
2.58*** 
(0.93) 
0.46 
(1.15) 
NFT Size squared   
-0.20** 
(0.10) 
-0.19* 
(0.10) 
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.11) 
NFT Organizational Tenure Diversity  
 
 
     0.46 
(1.64) 
-10.32** 
(5.13) 
-10.69** 
(4.88) 
NFT Organizational Tenure Squared   
 
 
8.69** 
(3.92) 
9.06** 
(3.74) 
NFT Dominant Functional Diversity   
 
 
 3.27*** 
(1.13) 
Firm Size 0.53 
(0.52) 
0.40 
(0.57) 
0.80 
(0.59) 
0.78 
(0.60) 
0.18 
(0.64) 
-0.10 
(0.62) 
Firm Age 0.08 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Generation in charge 0.67 
(0.80) 
0.70 
(0.81) 
0.73 
(0.79) 
0.70 
(0.81) 
1.06 
(0.80) 
0.72 
(0.77) 
Number of employed generation 0.61 
(0.90) 
0.53 
(0.92) 
0.44 
(0.90) 
0.40 
(0.92) 
0.08 
(0.90) 
0.24 
(0.86) 
TMT Educational Background Diversity  -5.30* 
(2.85) 
-5.63* 
(2.92) 
-6.09** 
(2.87) 
-6.23** 
(2.93) 
-5.11* 
(2.90) 
-6.02** 
(2.78) 
TMT Level of Studies  Diversity -2.90 
(2.17) 
-2.96 
(2.18) 
-2.85 
(2.14) 
-2.67 
(2.25) 
-4.04* 
(2.28) 
-4.06* 
(2.17) 
TMT Gender 3.15 
(2.61) 
3.20 
(2.63) 
3.26 
(2.57) 
3.24 
(2.60) 
3.25 
(2.52) 
2.92 
(2.40) 
Preperformance 0.74*** 
(0.07) 
0.74*** 
(0.07) 
0.71*** 
(0.07) 
0.71*** 
(0.07) 
0.70*** 
(0.07) 
0.68*** 
(0.07) 
TMT Age 3.90 
(5.43) 
4.09 
(5.46) 
2.81 
(5.40) 
2.67 
(5.45) 
4.22 
(5.35) 
5.15 
(5.10) 
TMT Average Organizational Tenure  -0.53*** 
(0.15) 
-0.52*** 
(0.15) 
-0.45*** 
(0.15) 
-0.45*** 
(0.15) 
-0.51*** 
(0.15) 
-0.56*** 
(0.14) 
TMT Average TMT Tenure 0.40*** 
(0.12) 
0.39*** 
(0.12) 
0.37*** 
(0.12) 
0.37*** 
(0.12) 
0.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.42*** 
(0.11) 
Ceo Tenure 0.04 
(0.06) 
0.36 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
Specialized CEO 1.86** 
(0.87) 
1.86*** 
(0.88) 
1.46 
(0.88) 
1.42 
(0.90) 
1.31 
(0.87) 
0.96 
(0.84) 
 Ceo Gender -2.93 
(2.05) 
-2.96 
(2.06) 
-2.58 
(2.02) 
-2.56 
(2.04) 
-2.55 
(1.98) 
-1.60 
(1.92) 
Ceo Age 0.00 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
Founder Ceo 0.91 
(1.15) 
0.88 
(1.16) 
0.93 
(1.13) 
0.95 
(1.14) 
0.63 
(1.12) 
0.39 
(1.07) 
Family Ceo 
-0.38 
(1.46) 
-0.35 
(1.48) 
0.09 
(1.46) 
0.08 
(1.47) 
0.30 
1.44 
-0.17 
(1.37) 
Const 
-2.94 
(7.22) 
-2.32 
(7.34) 
-8.77 
(7.84) 
-8.56 
(7.93) 
-3.54 
(8.05) 
2.02 
(7.09) 
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 
R-Squared 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.72 
Change in R-Squared - 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 0.03*** 
F-statistic 8.09 7.59 7.72 7.24 7.51 9.07 
Prob (F-statistic) *** *** *** *** *** *** 
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